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Three experiments were designed to test whether adult pet dogs are able to show inferential reasoning
when searching for their toy in a series of two-way choice tasks. The experimenter placed a toy under
one of two identical containers and then provided some information by manipulating the covers: either
both containers were lifted or just the empty or baited one. There were other trials when the experimenter
not only revealed the corresponding container but manipulated also the other one without showing its
content. In the second experiment the same conditions were used except that the content of the con-
tainers was revealed by strings without any human manipulation. Results of the two studies show that
dogs are able to use inferential reasoning by exclusion (i.e. they can ﬁnd the hidden toy if they have
seen where the toy was missing). However, dogs were able to solve the reasoning task only when they
could not rely on social-communicative cues (directional gesture and gaze cues) or could not use any other
simple discriminative stimuli (movement of a container) for making decisions. This suggests that dogs are
often prevented from showing reasoning abilities by pre-existing biases for social or movement cues.
Results of the third experiment also support the primary importance of social cueing because in another
object-choice task, individuals preferred to choose the ‘socially marked’ container (touching, gaze alterna-
tion) to the remotely moved one when they had no visual information about the location of the toy.
 2007 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Despite the wide range of studies based on human and
animal cognition published in the past decades, the
evolutionary emergence of reasoning abilities including
different types of logical reasoning in humans continues
to be a puzzle for cognitive science (Wright 2001). The
fundamental question is whether an observed problem-
solving behaviour is a result of gradual development in
performance due to learning processes or is a sudden solu-
tion emerging from mental reorganization of problem
elements (i.e. insight: Ko¨hler 1925). In distinguishing be-
tween learning and reasoning, many assume that even
though the more parsimonious learning processes can
never be fully excluded (Heyes 1993), reasoning can be
presumed if the subject shows an ‘insightful solution’ im-
mediately (i.e. shows adequate behaviour without explicit
training) in the ﬁrst few trials (Premack 1995).
To test for reasoning one may present a problem and
provide sufﬁcient but indirect information to solve it. One
way to study the reasoning abilities is the Piagetian object
permanence paradigm. In the invisible displacement task,
no direct cues specify that the desired reward has moved
behind the screen (i.e. the subject does not witness the
reward being dropped). The subject must infer, upon
seeing the empty container, that the object has been
transferred. Previous studies with several species showed
that some primates (e.g. orang-utans, Pongo pygmaeus: de
Blois et al. 1998; orang-utans: Call 2001; chimpanzees,
Pan troglodytes: Wood et al. 1980; cottontop tamarins,
Saguinus oedipus: Neiworth et al. 2003), magpies, Pica
pica (Pollok et al. 2000), grey parrots, Psittacus erithacus
(Pepperberg et al. 1997) and dogs, Canis familiaris
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(Gagnon & Dore´ 1992, 1993) were able to solve the single
invisible displacement tasks. However, it is doubtful
whether dogs really used inferential reasoning to ﬁnd
the reward or whether they solve the problem by using
local rules (Watson et al. 2001; Collier-Baker et al. 2004,
2006).
A simpler way to study inferential reasoning by exclu-
sion in animal species is two-way choice tasks. The
paradigmatic element of this approach presumes, as it is
in the object permanence task, that subjects are exposed
to either direct (witness the hiding) or indirect informa-
tion (e.g. the sight of an empty box).
In this case apes are known to be skilful at making
inferences by exclusion about the location of hidden food.
Premack & Premack (1994) reported that when chimpan-
zees can see a human putting two types of fruit in two
boxes (one in each) and later are allowed to witness the
same person eating one of the fruits, they prefer to choose
the box containing the other type of fruit.
Call & Carpenter (2001) reported that apes (chimpan-
zees and orang-utans) were correctly able to infer the loca-
tion of food in one of several tubes based on the contents
of the ﬁrst tube(s) they looked into. Subjects were pre-
sented with a ﬁnding game in which food or stickers
were hidden in one of two or three tubes. They varied
whether subjects saw the baiting of the tubes, whether
subjects could see through the tubes, and whether there
was a delay between baiting and presentation of the tubes
to subjects. They measured not only whether subjects
chose the correct tube but also whether they spontane-
ously looked into one or more of the tubes before choos-
ing one. Most subjects appropriately looked into the
tubes before choosing one, but they did this more often
when they had not seen the baiting, than when they
had seen the baiting and were able to infer the location
of the reward.
More recently, Call (2004) reported a series of two-way
choice tasks using direct and/or indirect informing cues ei-
ther in visual or in auditory modality in apes. His subjects
preferred to choose the baited container even when both
containers were manipulated but only the empty one
was either shown or shaken, and concluded that their per-
formance was based on inferential reasoning by exclusion
rather than on associative learning.
In addition to the numerous ape studies (see Tomasello
2000 for review), experimental observations on other
species are important in order to broaden our understand-
ing of evolutionary emergence of reasoning abilities. We
may assume that the domestic dog is a promising subject
because its ancestor was a cooperative hunting carnivore,
which could be a determining factor in the evolution of
sophisticated constructional skills (Gibson 1990). Domes-
tic dogs are evolutionary distant relatives of humans, but
have been subjected to very similar (‘human-like’) adapta-
tional demands in the past 10000 years. This could
account for the dog’s sophisticated social cognition (see
Hare & Tomasello 2005 and Miklo´si & Topa´l 2005 for a
recent discussion). Dogs are not only able to make
inferences about the communicative meaning of human
gestural cues as in indicating the location of reward (e.g.
Soproni et al. 2001) but they seem to understand the
communicative cues in complex ‘triadic’ situations where
a human alternately interacts either with them or with
another human as well (Vira´nyi et al. 2004).
On the other hand, some results from understanding
meanseend connection show that dogs are not able to
process sophisticated forms of physical causality (Osthaus
et al. 2005) and lend support to the speculations that this
‘inability’ is the indirect consequence of the domestica-
tion process (Frank 1980; Hare et al. 2002; but see Miklo´si
et al. 2004 for review).
Other studies (Szetei et al. 2003; Bra¨uer et al. 2006) have
shown that in particular situations dogs, unlike apes, are
more willing to rely on human communicative and be-
havioural cues to ﬁnd a reward than on perceptual cues
of the physical world or on causal cues. For example,
dogs chose the empty container when they received direct
perceptual information about the place of the food (sub-
jects were allowed to sniff both containers) and a contra-
dictory communicative cue (human pointed at the
empty container; Szetei et al. 2003).
Some studies based on object permanence paradigm
suggest that the ability to understand causal relation-
ships as well as responsiveness to social cues inﬂuence
the performance of dogs in simple hide-and-search tasks
(Watson et al. 2001; Topa´l et al. 2006). This means that
the inferential reasoning of dogs in a search task may
be affected by pre-existing biases for social cues. In gen-
eral, the two-way object-choice task does not separate
the perceptual information from the communicative
cues because showing the empty container to the subject
involves both kinds of information (manipulating the
object and revealing its content). In the present experi-
ment, dogs were provided with direct and indirect visual
cues about the location of their favourite toy, a ball, to
see whether their choice behaviour could be interpreted
in terms of inferential reasoning. In the ﬁrst experiment,
visual cues (sight of the toy or sight of the empty
container) and the attention-getting/social-inﬂuencing
effect of human manipulation (touching, moving and
looking at the container) were combined independently
in the different experimental conditions.
EXPERIMENT 1
Methods
Subjects
Forty-two adult pet dogs and their owners were re-
cruited on voluntary basis. The only criterion for selection
was that the dogs had to be highly motivated to play with
a toy.
Three dogs were rejected during the ﬁrst few trials
because they lost interest in ﬁnding and retrieving the
ball and an additional four subjects were excluded from
the ﬁnal analyses due to signiﬁcant side preference (i.e.
regardless of the actual place of the toy they approached
the same container at least 10 times out of the 12 test
trials, binomial test for side bias: P < 0.04).
The remaining 35 dogs (23 males, 12 females;
mean age  SD ¼ 4  2.28 years) included 15 different
recognized breeds (7 Parson Russel Terriers, 5 German
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Shepherd Dogs, 2 Malinois, 2 Labrador Retrievers, 2
Golden Retrievers, 2 Rotweilers, 2 German Pointers, 1
Miniature Pinscher, 1 Springer Spaniel, 1 Jack Russel
Terrier, 1 Border Collie, 1 Pumi, 1 Dobermann, 1 Argen-
tine Dog, 1 Mudi) and ﬁve mongrels.
All owners were unaware of the hypotheses and goals of
the study.
Procedure
Experimental arrangement. The experiments were re-
corded in a room (5  2.5 m) where two identical con-
tainers (turned upside down) were placed 1.5 m apart to
hide the toy. Containers were composed of an outer part
(a brown plastic ﬂowerpot, 22 cm in diameter) and an in-
ner one, a smaller brown plastic ﬂowerpot (20 cm in diam-
eter). These were telescoped so that they could be lifted
together or one at a time by means of two strings (Fig. 1).
Pretest trials. The owner made the dog stand at a pre-
determined point in the room. The experimenter nick-
named the dog and placed the two containers equidistant
from the dog (2 m). Next she caught the dog’s attention
with the toy in her hand and then placed it under one
of the containers while she alternated her gaze three times
between the dog and the baited container. After baiting,
she lifted up the baited container to about 40 cm to reveal
the ball under the container for 3 s; meanwhile, she alter-
nated her gaze three times between the dog and the
manipulated container. Finally, the experimenter replaced
the container, took up her initial position, turned her back
to the dog and the dog was allowed to choose. If the dog
chose the baited container, it was allowed to play with the
toy for a few seconds. The trial was repeated once more,
but instead by hiding the toy under the other container.
In trials 3 and 4, the same procedure was repeated with
the exception that after the baiting, the experimenter
lifted only the outer part of container (in the same way
as described above). All dogs (except those who were
excluded due to motivational problems: see Subjects)
met the criterion of 3 or 4 correct choices.
Test trials. Each trial consisted of the following three
phases.
(1) Baiting: Having been called and shown the ball, the
dog was prevented from witnessing the concealment by
a green plastic barrier. The experimenter manipulated the
left and then the right container and left the ball under
one of them. Then she took up her initial position
between the containers and the visual barrier was
removed.
(2) Providing information: The experimenter called the
dog and administered one of the six following conditions.
(a) Both: The experimenter showed the content of both
containers: ﬁrst she stepped to the container on her left
hand side and lifted it up (both the inner and the outer
parts) revealing its content for 3 s. In parallel, she alter-
nated her gaze three times between the dog and the ma-
nipulated container. Next she went to the other
container on her right and repeated the same procedure.
(b) Baited only: The experimenter showed only the
content of the baited container. She went to the baited
container and lifted it up to reveal its content for 3 s and
alternated her gaze between the dog and the baited con-
tainer. She did not approach and touch the empty
container.
(c) Balanced baited: The experimenter showed only the
content of the baited container (revealing its content for
3 s and alternating her gaze between the dog and the
baited container). She also lifted the outer part of the
empty container and made gaze alternations between
the dog and the empty container.
(d) Empty only: The experimenter showed the content
of the empty container. She went to the empty container
and showed its content, making gaze alternations be-
tween the dog and the container, but she did not
approach and touch the baited container.
(e) Balanced empty: The experimenter showed only the
content of the empty container but lifted also the outer
part of the baited container accompanied by gaze alterna-
tions between the dog and the container.
(f) Control: The experimenter manipulated both con-
tainers while she alternated her gaze three times between
the dog and the hiding places. She did not provide
information about the content of the containers because
she lifted only their outer parts.
(3) Selecting a container: After these demonstrations the
experimenter returned to her starting position and turned
her back to the dog, and the owner released the dog to
allow it to make a choice. If the dog chose the baited
container, it was allowed to play with the ball for a few
seconds.
Each dog received two trials per condition (one left and
one right baiting) in a single session (12 trials in all). The
order of the conditions and reward positions (left versus
right) were predetermined and semirandom with the
restriction that the ball did not appear more than two
times in succession on the same side.
The whole session was videotaped and the choice
behaviour of the subject was analysed later.
Data collection and analysis
A container was regarded as chosen by the dog if the
dog turned it over, or touched it with its paw/muzzle or at
least approached it (its paw/muzzle was closer than 10 cm
to the container). To assess interobserver agreement a sec-
ond person blind to the conditions scored a randomly se-
lected sample of 20%. Cohen’s kappa value was 1 (100%
agreement), showing an extremely high level of reliability.Figure 1. Possible ways of lifting the containers.
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Analysing the overall performance
The number of correct choices (0, 1 or 2) was compared
between the different testing conditions using nonpara-
metric statistical methods (Friedman ANOVA, Wilcoxon
two-sample test and Wilcoxon signed-ranks test with
false discovery rate correction [FDRbl adjustment, see
Benjamini et al. 2001]) at the group level.
Testing the relevance of the choice rules for the
description of the dogs’ performance
In principle, subjects could choose between the two
possible target places on the basis of many simultaneous
decision-making processes which can be formulated into
a series of ‘choice rules’. These local rules (Natale et al. 1986)
may be effective in helping subjects to recover the target
object. Therefore, we formulated seven simple rules that
could control the behaviour of the dog during the tests.
The detailed descriptions of the rules are as follows (see
also Table 1).
Deductive inferring: ‘Go to the other container if you
have seen one being empty!’ Correct choice could be
made on the basis of this rule in those conditions where
the dog had visual access to the content of the empty
container (Both, Empty only, Balanced empty).
Using direct visual information: ‘Choose the container
under which you have seen the ball!’ Dogs could rely on
this rule when the experimenter showed the content of
the baited container (Both, Baited only and Balanced
baited conditions).
Preferring the moving container: ‘Visit the container
which was moved!’ Dogs could rely on this rule when only
one container was lifted up by the experimenter to reveal
its content (Baited only and Empty conditions).
Preferring the container moved last: ‘Visit the container
which was last moved!’ In those conditions when the
experimenter moved both containers (Both, Balanced
baited, Balanced empty and Control conditions), the order
of the moving container could cause a bias in dogs’ choice
behaviour (having an increased attractiveness to the
container moved last).
Preferring the container manipulated exclusively by the
human: ‘Visit the container which was manipulated by
the experimenter!’ In those conditions when only one of
the containers had been manipulated (Baited only, Empty
only), dogs’ choice behaviour could be based on the
human manipulation which may have increased the
attractiveness of that container.
Preferring the container manipulated last by the hu-
man: ‘Go to the container which was last manipulated by
the experimenter!’ In those conditions, when the exper-
imenter manipulated both containers (Both, Balanced
baited, Balanced only, Control), the sequence of human
cueing could cause a bias in dogs’ choice behaviour
(having a stronger aftermath of human cueing in case of
the last manipulated container).
Preferring the container rewarded previously: ‘Go to
the container under which the toy was hidden during the
previous trial!’ The sight of the reward under one of the
containers (and getting the toy from under it) could cause
the selection of the same container independently of the
informing cues in the subsequent trial. Although the
willingness to perform such perseverative actions often
leads to erroneous choice behaviour (Watson et al. 2001),
Table 1. Relevance of the predetermined choice rules on the dogs’ (N ¼ 35) performance in the different experimental conditions in
Experiments 1 and 2
Descriptive name of the choice rules
Conditions Experiment
Deductive
inferring
Using direct
visual
information
Preferring
the moving
container
Preferring
the
container
moved last
Preferring
the
container
manipulated
by the
human
Preferring
the container
manipulated
last
Preferring the
container
rewarded
previously
Both 1 34-1-0** 34-1-0** d 1-34-0, NS d 1-34-0, NS 3-7-25**
2 27-3-0** 27-3-0** d 1-28-1, NS d d 3-11-16**
Baited only 1 d 34-1-0** 34-1-0** d 34-1-0** d 6-12-17, NS
2 d 29-1-0-** 22-8-0** d d d 1-8-21**
Balanced
baited
1 d 28-7-0** d 4-28-3, NS d 4-28-3, NS 3-14-18**
2 d 25-4-1** d 4-24-2, NS d d 3-10-17**
Empty only 1 2-14-19** d 19-14-2** d 19-14-2** d 11-18-6, NS
2 1-15-14** d 14-13-3* d d d 6-17-7, NS
Balanced
empty
1 16-19-0** d d 9-16-10, NS d 9-16-10, NS 7-22-7, NS
2 11-18-1** d d 3-13-14* d d 5-14-11, NS
Control 1 d d d 9-16-10, NS d 9-16-10, NS 10-16-9, NS
2 d d d 2-20-8, NS d d 2-16-12*
The first numeral labels the number of dogs showing full correspondence with the rule (two corresponding choices), the middle numeral labels
the number of dogs showing no preferential use of the rule (one corresponding choice) and the third numeral labels the number of subjects
ignoring the rule (zero corresponding choice). The levels of significance are indicated by *P < 0.05 and **P < 0.01. Asterisks are bolded where
dogs’ choice behaviour corresponds with the rule significantly better than chance performance (Wilcoxon signed-ranks test with FDRbl adjust-
ment, hypothetical median ¼ 1) and they are not highlighted where dogs show significant ignorance of the rule.
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in principle, the dog’s behaviour can be inﬂuenced by this
in each condition.
Importantly, these rules are not exclusive and in certain
conditions, the rule on which the dog relies is indistin-
guishable (see Table 1). At the same time some of these
choice rules can be nonrelevant in certain conditions
(e.g. when the human informant does not show the con-
tent of the baited container, it is not possible to make
a choice using direct visual information).
The explanatory value of each rule in each condition for
each dog was deﬁned as the number of trials (0, 1 or 2) in
which the choice behaviour of the dog was in accordance
with the choice resultant from the rule. In line with these
subjects, they can be categorized into three main groups.
Their choice behaviour corresponds with the rule in both
trials (full correspondence) or only in one of the trials (no
preferentialuseof the rule)or inneitherof the trials (ignoring
the rule). Using this categorization we have analysed
whether subjects relied on any of the choice rules based
upon their decisionor showed explicit ignorance of that rule
(Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests with FDRbl adjustment).
Results
Comparing the number of correct choices
between the testing conditions
The performance of the dogs was strongly inﬂuenced by
thetypesofthetest trials (c2(5,35)¼ 110.74,P < 0.0001,Fig.2).
The number of correct choices was at chance level in the
Control condition (T() ¼ T(þ) ¼ 85.5, N ¼ 35, P ¼ 1).
The performance of the dogs was signiﬁcantly above
chance level when they were provided direct information
about the location of the toy (Both, Baited and Balanced
baited conditions: T() ¼ 0, N ¼ 35, P < 0.0001 in each)
and also when they were shown the content of only the
empty container, although both containers had been
manipulated by the experimenter (Balanced empty:
T() ¼ 8.5, N ¼ 35, P < 0.001). In these three conditions
the number of correct choices was signiﬁcantly above
the performance level shown in the Control trials (Both
condition: T() ¼ 9.5, N ¼ 35, P < 0.01; Baited only con-
dition: T() ¼ 0, P < 0.01; Balanced baited condition:
T() ¼ 8.5, N ¼ 35, P < 0.01; Balanced empty condition:
T() ¼ 26.0, N ¼ 35, P < 0.05).
However, when the experimenter had manipulated only
the empty container showing its content (Empty condi-
tion), the dogs chose the baited one below chance level
(T(þ) ¼ 10.5, N ¼ 35, P < 0.0001) and their performance
was signiﬁcantly lower compared with that shown in
the Control condition (T(þ) ¼ 45.0, N ¼ 35, P < 0.01).
Testing the relevance of the choice rules for the
description of the dogs’ performance
Table 1 shows the dogs’ reliance on the predetermined
choice rules in each condition and summarizes the results
of the statistical analyses.
Comparisons of the observed choice behaviour in Both
conditionwith the chanceperformance (nopreferential use
of the rule hypothetical median ¼ 1) have shown preferen-
tial use of the rules ‘Deductive inferring’ and ‘Using direct
visual information’ (T() ¼ 0, N ¼ 35, P < 0.01 for both)
and signiﬁcant ignorance of ‘Preferring the container re-
warded previously’ (T(þ) ¼ 43.5, N ¼ 35, P < 0.01). More
importantly, however, in this condition the possible effects
of ‘Deductive inferring’ and ‘Using direct visual informa-
tion’ cannot be distinguished because both of them suggest
the same choice (i.e. the baited container).
In the Baited only condition the dogs’ behaviour
corresponded signiﬁcantly more strongly with the choices
suggested by the ‘Using direct visual information’ rule, the
‘Preferring the moving container’ rule and the ‘Preferring
the human-manipulated container’ rule (comparison with
chance performance: T() ¼ 0, N ¼ 35, P < 0.01).
In this case we could not decide whether dogs preferred
to rely on direct visual information or on human cueing
and on movement of the baited container because the
aforementioned three rules had the same outcome (i.e. the
experimenter manipulated and lifted only the baited
container).
When the dogs’ choices are compared with the chance
level performance in the Balanced baited condition, their
behaviour corresponded signiﬁcantly with the ‘Using
direct visual information’ rule (T() ¼ 0, N ¼ 35,
P < 0.01) but not with those other choice rules which
can be referred to as relevant in this condition. In
addition, the rule ‘Preferring the container rewarded
previously’ was signiﬁcantly ignored by the dogs in this
condition (T(þ) ¼ 33, N ¼ 35, P < 0.01).
In those trials when the experimenter manipulated and
revealed the content of only the empty container (Empty
only condition) dogs seemingly did not use the ‘Deductive
inferring’ rule (their choice behaviour ﬁts this rule
signiﬁcantly less than what is expected by chance;
T(þ) ¼ 22, N ¼ 35, P < 0.01), while they show a signiﬁcant
2.5
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Figure 2. The number of correct choices in the different types of test
trials in the ‘social’ task (Experiment 1): median, quartiles and ex-
tremes. Significant differences from control are indicated by
*P < 0.05, **P < 0.01 (N ¼ 35, Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests with
FDRbl adjustment).
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willingness to make decisions as predicted by the rule
‘Preferring the container manipulated by the human’
and by the rule ‘Preferring the moving container’
(T() ¼ 22, N ¼ 35, P < 0.01 in each). However, in con-
trast to the Empty only trials, in the Balanced empty con-
dition (the human manipulated, touched and looked at
both containers revealing only the content of the empty
one), dogs’ choice behaviour could be explained by the
‘Deductive inferring’ rule (T() ¼ 0, N ¼ 35, P < 0.01).
However, they did not follow the other local rules (‘Prefer-
ring the last manipulated container’, ‘Preferring the con-
tainer moved last’ and ‘Preferring the previously
rewarded container’).
None of the predetermined local rules seemed to be
relevant for explaining the dogs’ choice behaviour in
Control trials. That is, when the human informant
manipulated equally both containers but did not give
any relevant information about the location of the bait,
dogs preferred neither of the choice rules (comparisons
with chance performance: ‘Preferring the last manipulated
container’ T() ¼ 150, N ¼ 35, P ¼ NS, ‘Preferring the
container moved last’ T() ¼ 150, N ¼ 35, P ¼ NS and
‘Preferring the previously rewarded container’ T() ¼ 117,
N ¼ 35, P ¼ NS).
Discussion
These results show that, not surprisingly, dogs were able
to solve the search-for-the-toy task when they had been
informed about the location of the toy by direct visual
cues (sight of the toy). However, in those conditions in
which a human gave indirect visual cues (sight of the
empty container) the dogs’ performance was strongly
inﬂuenced by the accompanying cues. When human
manipulation was unbalanced (i.e. only the nonrewarded
container was moved and marked by the human socially),
dogs showed clear preference for the obviously empty
container suggesting that these perceptual cues could
supersede the reasoning abilities in dogs. In this case,
reasoning has been seemingly counteracted by the rule
suggesting preference for the moving container which was
also manipulated communicatively (touching the con-
tainer, gaze alternation between the container and the
dog) by the human.
In contrast, when dogs could observe communicative
cues (looking at and touching) and movement for both
target places in a balanced fashion, they were able to
choose the rewarded container even if only the content of
the empty one had been shown. This suggests that dogs
can still infer the location of their toy relying on the
‘Deductive inferring’ rule.
Unconscious cueing of the human participants or smell
of the reward did not inﬂuence the dogs’ choice behaviour
as their performance was at chance in the control
condition. Results suggest that dogs are able to perform
simple inferential reasoning, but in fact they are often
prevented from showing this competence by pre-existing
biases for such salient cues as movement of the container
and social marking of some hiding locations. However, in
this experiment these two types of perceptual information
could not be separated from each other and the relative
importance of ‘social marking’ versus moving of the
container could not be established.
EXPERIMENT 2
In a subsequent experiment, the effects of the movement
of the container (without human communicative cues)
were tested. In this case the containers were moved
remotely by strings without any perceivable human
manipulations. The purpose of this experiment was to
investigate whether the performance of dogs in the
‘inferential reasoning task’ improves if the unbalanced
human social-communicative cues are removed from the
experimental procedure.
Methods
Subjects
By means of the same recruitment procedure and
selection criteria as in Experiment 1, 36 dogs were entered
on a voluntary basis by private owners. The only criterion
for selection was that the dogs had to be highly motivated
to play with a toy.
Two dogs were rejected during the ﬁrst few trials when
they lost interest in ﬁnding and retrieving the ball, an
additional subject was excluded from the ﬁnal analyses
due to signiﬁcant side preference (i.e. regardless of the
actual place of the toy, she/he approached the same
container at least 10 times out of the 12 test trials:
binomial test for side bias: P < 0.06), and three other
dogs were rejected due to stressful behaviour when the
containers were moved by strings.
The remaining 30 dogs (15 males, 15 females; mean
age  SD ¼ 4.35  2.44 years) included 14 different recog-
nized breeds (3 German Shepherd Dogs, 2 Black Russian
Terriers, 4 Vizslas, 4 Labrador Retrievers, 3 Malinois, 1
Jack Russel Terrier, 1 Border Collie, 1 Groenendael, 1
Argentinean Dogo, 1 Mudi, 1 Jagd Terrier, 1 Shcipperke,
1 Australian Shepherd, 1 Tibetan Terrier) and ﬁve mongrels.
All owners were unaware of the hypotheses and goals of
the study.
Procedure
Experimental arrangement. Experimental observations
were recorded in the same room as in Experiment 1. In
this case, however, the experimenter could show the
content of the containers without any direct manipula-
tion by hand (they were moved remotely by thin nylon
strings).
The same four containers that were used in Experiment
1 had individual strings attached to each container and
were arranged in the same manner as they were in
Experiment 1, but the strings ran out in an adjacent
room from where movements of the containers could be
controlled.
Two experimenters participated in the test. One (E1)
stayed in the experimental room and managed the pretest
trials and the baiting during the test trials. The other (E2)
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remained in the adjacent room and controlled the
movement of the containers by the strings according to
the test conditions.
Pretest trials. These were the same as in Experiment 1
except that the container that was chosen by the dog was
lifted up by the strings, not by E1 (without any human
manipulation).
Test trials. Each trial consisted of the following three
phases:
(1) Baiting: see Experiment 1.
(2) Providing information: This was the same as in
Experiment 1, except that the containers were lifted up by
strings without any human manipulations. E2 adminis-
tered the same six conditions: Both, Baited only, Balanced
baited, Empty only, Balanced empty, and Control.
(3) Selecting a container: see Experiment 1.
Each dog received two trials per condition (one left and
one right baiting) in a single session (12 trials in all). The
order of the conditions and reward positions (left versus
right) were predetermined and semirandom with the
restriction that the ball did not appear more than two
times in succession on the same side.
The whole session was videotaped and the choice
behaviour of the subject was analysed later. Data collec-
tion and analysis methods were basically the same as in
Experiment 1.
Similarly to Experiment 1, in principle, subjects could
choose between the two possible target places on the basis
of several simultaneous decision-making processes which
can be formulated into a series of ‘choice rules’ (see Table 1)
except for those rules which relied on the human cues
(‘Preferring the container manipulated by the humans’
and the ‘Preferring the container manipulated last’) which
were irrelevant in this experiment because the containers
was moved by strings without any visible human
manipulation.
The explanatory value of each rule in each condition for
each dog was deﬁned as in Experiment 1. Using the same
categorization we analysed whether subjects relied on any
of the choice rules based upon their choice or showed
explicit ignorance of that rule.
Results
Comparing the number of correct choices
between the testing conditions
The performance of the dogs was strongly inﬂuenced by
the types of the test trials (c2(5,30) ¼ 90.353, P < 0.0001,
Fig. 3).
The number of correct choices was at chance level in the
Control condition (T() ¼ 277.5, N ¼ 30, P > 0.999).
Performance of the dogs was signiﬁcantly above chance
level when they had been provided direct visual informa-
tion about the location of the toy (Both and Baited only
conditions: T() ¼ 0, N ¼ 30, P < 0.0001 in each; Bal-
anced baited condition: T() ¼ 29, N ¼ 30, P < 0.0001)
and also when they were shown the content of only the
empty container, although both containers had been
lifted up by the strings (Balanced empty: T() ¼ 7,
N ¼ 30, P ¼ 0.0046). In these three conditions the number
of correct choices was signiﬁcantly above the performance
level shown in the Control trials (Both condition:
T() ¼ 10, N ¼ 30, P < 0.0001; Baited only condition:
T() ¼ 0, P < 0.0001; Balanced baited condition: T() ¼
20, N ¼ 30, P < 0.0001; Balanced empty condition:
T() ¼ 36.0, N ¼ 30, P < 0.05).
However, when the content of only the empty con-
tainer was shown (Empty condition), the dogs chose the
baited one below chance level (T(þ) ¼ 8.5, N ¼ 30,
P < 0.001) and their performance was signiﬁcantly lower
compared with that shown in the Control condition
(T(þ) ¼ 21, N ¼ 30, P < 0.05).
Testing the relevance of the choice rules for the
description of the dogs’ performance
Table 1 shows the dogs’ reliance on the predetermined
choice rules in each condition and summarizes the results
of the statistical analyses. As in Experiment 1, in Both con-
dition dogs relied on their choices of ‘Deductive inferring’
and ‘Using direct visual information’ (T() ¼ 0, N ¼ 30,
P < 0.01 for both) rules. Again more important, in this
condition the possible effects of the above two rules can-
not be distinguished because both of them suggest the
same choice (i.e. the baited container).
In the Baited only condition the dogs’ behaviour
corresponded signiﬁcantly more strongly with the choices
suggested by the ‘Using direct visual information’ rule and
the ‘Preferring the moving container’ rule (comparison
with chance performance: T() ¼ 0, N ¼ 30, P < 0.01). In
this case, we could not decide whether dogs preferred to
rely on direct visual information or on the moving of
** ** ** * *
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Figure 3. The number of correct choices in the different types of test
trials in the ‘asocial’ task (Experiment 2): median, quartiles and ex-
tremes. Significant differences from control are indicated by
*P < 0.05, **P < 0.01 (N ¼ 35, Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests with
FDRbl adjustment).
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the baited container because the aforementioned two
rules had the same outcome (i.e. only the baited container
was lifted up by its strings). In the Balanced baited condi-
tion the dogs’ behaviour corresponded signiﬁcantly with
the ‘Using direct visual information’ rule (T() ¼ 13.5,
N ¼ 30, P < 0.01).
In those trials when only the content of the empty
container was presented for the subjects (Empty only
condition), dogs seemingly did not use the ‘Deductive
inferring’ rule (their choice behaviour ﬁts this rule signif-
icantly less than what is expected by chance;
T() ¼ 112, N ¼ 30, P < 0.01), while they show a signiﬁ-
cant willingness to make decisions as predicted by the rule
‘Preferring the moving container’ (T() ¼ 27, N ¼ 30,
P < 0.05).
In contrast to the Empty only trials, in the Balanced
empty condition (the content of the empty container was
shown and in the case of the baited container, only the
outer part was lifted up by the strings), dogs’ choice
behaviour could be explained by the ‘Deductive inferring’
rule (T() ¼ 6.5, N ¼ 30, P < 0.01). However, they re-
jected to follow the ‘Preferring the container moved last’
rule (T() ¼ 126, N ¼ 30, P < 0.05).
In Control trials, that is, when both containers were
moved by their strings, but there was no relevant in-
formation given about the location of the bait, dogs did
not rely on the ‘Preferring the container moved last’ rule
(T() ¼ 44, N ¼ 30, P ¼ NS), while they seemed to reject
‘Preferring the previously rewarded container’
(T() ¼ 90, N ¼ 30, P < 0.05).
It is important to note that the ‘Preferring the container
rewarded previously’ rule was not preferred in any of the
conditions but even more it was signiﬁcantly rejected in
many cases (Both: T(þ) ¼ 31.5, N ¼ 30, P < 0.01; Baited
only: T(þ) ¼ 12, N ¼ 30, P < 0.01; Balanced baited:
T() ¼ 178.5, N ¼ 30, P < 0.01; Empty: T() ¼ 49,
N ¼ 30, P ¼ NS; Balanced empty: T() ¼ 93.5, N ¼ 30,
P ¼ NS; Control: T() ¼ 90, N ¼ 30, P < 0.01).
Discussion
Compared with the results of the ﬁrst experiment, dogs
showed basically the same choice preference in the
different conditions. When the human social-communi-
cative cues were excluded and the content of the empty
container was revealed by means of strings, the vertical
moving of the empty container (as a salient cue) per se
attracted the dogs based upon their choices the same way
as in the case of social marking.
In summary, the above two experiments have shown
that in accordance with earlier results (Szetei et al. 2003),
the sight of the reward upon cueing had the strongest in-
ﬂuence on the dogs’ choice behaviour and the effect of the
movement and the ‘social marking’ (i.e. preferring the
container manipulated by the human) also had a major
impact on subjects’ performance.
Interestingly, dogs did not show preference for such
simple local rules as ‘Preferring the container manipulated
last by the human’, ‘Preferring the container moved last’
or ‘Preferring the container rewarded in the previous trial’
even in the control condition when neither direct nor
indirect informing cues were given.
We should note, however, that there was no such
condition in which the ‘Using direct visual information’,
‘Preferring the container manipulated by the human’ or
‘Preferring the moving container’ rule would predict
contradictory choice. So the behaviour-inﬂuencing effect
of these factors cannot be compared directly.
EXPERIMENT 3
The results above have shown that human manipulation
(social-communicative component: approach, gaze alter-
nations, directional gestures towards the container) and/
or the movements of the containers (asocial-discriminative
component) make that location attractive for the dogs
despite the fact that the manipulated container is shown
to be empty. Therefore, a third experiment was designed
to answer the following questions:
Does human manipulation of the empty container
override the effect of direct visual information (sight of
the reward in the nonmanipulated container)?
Which component, the social-communicative or the
asocial-discriminative one, can be regarded as the more
important factor in the dogs’ choice?
Using a novel apparatus (see Fig. 4) we could separate
the following factors from one another upon cueing: (1)
social cues (approach, touching, gaze alternation); (2)
the movements of the container; and (3) showing the con-
tent of the container.
Methods
Subjects
Twenty-six adult pet dogs participated in this experi-
ment and the only criterion for selection was that the dogs
had to be highly motivated to play with a toy. None of
them participated in the ﬁrst and the second experiments.
One individual was excluded after the ﬁrst few trials due
to motivation problems.
The other 25 dogs (15 males, 10 females; mean
age  SD ¼ 3.2  1.92 years) included eight different rec-
ognized breeds (5 Border Collies, 3 Parson Russell Terriers,
1 Airdale Terrier, 2 Malinois, 1 Jagd Terrier, 1 Golden
Retriever, 1 Groenendael, 1 Jack Russel Terrier, 1 Cocker
(a) (b)
Figure 4. The container in (a) ‘closed’ and (b) ‘open’ positions.
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spaniel, 1 Husky, 1 Australian Shepherd, 1 American Bull-
dog, 1 Welsh Terrier) and ﬁve mongrels.
All owners were unaware of the hypotheses and goals of
the study.
Experimental arrangement
Experimental observations were recorded in the same
room as in Experiment 1. In this case, however, the
experimenter could show the content of the boxes
without any direct manipulation by hand (control was
achieved remotely by a thin nylon string: see Figs 4, 5).
The two boxes were attached to a wooden frame with
two pairs of strings which were used for moving the boxes
either vertically or horizontally (Figs 4, 5). The upper side
of the frame was covered by a black screen so that the ex-
perimenter could lift the front side of the boxes or could
move the boxes horizontally by using the strings in an un-
obtrusive manner. Each box could be positioned either at
the point labelled P1 (close to the frame position) or at P2
(distant position). At the beginning of the trials the dog
was held by its owner at a distance of 2 m from the exper-
imenter while the experimenter was standing behind the
screen equidistant from the boxes and was facing the dog.
Procedure
Pretest trials. The procedure for the pretest trials was
basically the same as in Experiment 1 except that the
experimenter made the ball visible by lifting the inner box
by the string. In the four consecutive trials all dogs except one
individual met the criteria of at least three correct choices.
Test. Test trials consisted of the same steps as in Experi-
ment 1 (Baiting, Providing information, Selecting a con-
tainer) andthebasicprocedurewas identical to thatdescribed
above. After baiting, the experimenter called the dog by its
name and administered one of the following conditions.
String/baited only: Boxes were placed near to the frame
(P1, see Fig. 4). The experimenter stood behind the screen
seemingly motionless and elevated the inner part of the
baited box to reveal the ball by using the string (R1 or
L1). The experimenter was wearing black sunglasses to
avoid any unconscious cueing. After 3 s the inner box
was lowered and the dog was allowed to make a choice.
String/both: Arrangement of the boxes and the way of
informing the dog about the location of the reward was
the same as in the ‘String/Baited Only’ condition; how-
ever, the experimenter showed the contents of both
containers by using the strings (R1 and L1).
Human/baited only: Boxes were placed near to the
frame (P1), the screen was removed and the experimenter
did not wear the dark sunglasses. The way of informing
was identical to the ‘Baited Only’ trial in Experiment 1.
The experimenter stepped to the baited box and lifted its
inner part, revealing the content of the box for 3 s. In par-
allel she alternated her gaze three times between the dog
and the manipulated container. Then she returned to
24 cm
R1 R2
R3
L2 L1
L3
29 cm 38 cm 29 cm 24 cm
133 cm
P1 P2 P3 P4
70 cm
Figure 5. Experimental apparatus. There are six hooks labelled as R1eR3 and L1eL3.
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her starting position and turned her back to the dog, and
the owner released the dog to make its choice.
Human/both: The position of the boxes and the
method of informing was the same as in the ‘Human/
Baited Only’ condition with the exception that the
experimenter showed the contents of both containers.
Visual cue versus human-given cues: The two boxes
were close to the frame. One after the other, the experi-
menter showed the content of the baited box by using the
string (R1 or L1) similarly as in the ‘String/Baited Only’
condition, and manipulated the empty box as well
without showing its content: the experimenter put her
palm on its top and alternated her gaze three times
between the dog and the manipulated container. Finally,
she returned to her starting position (behind the screen)
and put her sunglasses on.
Visual cue versus box-movement: The rewarded box was
placed close to the frame (P1), while the empty box was at
a distant position (P2). The experimenter remained be-
hind the screen throughout the trial wearing dark sun-
glasses. She showed the content of the baited box by the
string (R1 or L1, as described above) and pulled the empty
container from P2 to P1 position with the help of the
horizontal string (R3 or L3).
Human-given cues versus box-movement: The experi-
menter showed the content of neither the baited box nor
the empty box. One of the boxes was placed close to the
frame (P1), while the other one was in distant position
(P2). The experimenter put her palm on the top of the ﬁrst
box and alternated her gaze between the dog and this box
three times. Then she returned to her starting position
(behind the screen) and put her sunglasses on. The other
box was remotely moved from P2 to P1 position using the
horizontal string (R3 or L3). In one of these two trials the
human-manipulated box was baited, and in the other trial
the string-moved box contained the toy.
Control: Both hiding places were located close to the
frame (P1). The experimenter did not provide information
about the content of the boxes: she stood motionless
wearing the sunglasses behind the screen for 10 s and
then the dog was allowed to make a choice.
Each dog received two trials with each condition in
a single session (16 trials in all). Similarly to Experiment 1,
all conditions were presented in semirandom order and the
position of the reward (left versus right) was also randomly
determinedwith the restriction that the ball did not appear
more than two times in succession on the same side.
Data analysis
The number of correct choices was recorded and was
compared with chance level (Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests),
andWilcoxon signed-ranks testswithFDRbl adjustmentwas
used to make pairwise comparisons between conditions.
Results
Performance in conditions involving direct
visual information
Dogs were signiﬁcantly above the 50% chance perfor-
mance in those conditions, when they had received direct
visual information about the content of either the baited
box only or both the baited and the empty ones (String/
baited only: T() ¼ 0, P < 0.0001; String/both: T() ¼ 0,
P < 0.0001; Human/baited only: T() ¼ 0, P < 0.0001;
Human/both: T() ¼ 0, P < 0.0001). Moreover, dogs per-
formed above chance level also in the two testing condi-
tions when the direct view of the reward and the social
cues or the movement of a box were presented on conﬂict-
ing sides (Visual cue versus human-given cues: T() ¼ 0,
P < 0.0001; Visual cues versus box-movement: T() ¼ 0,
P < 0.0001). Accordingly, in all of these conditions (where
direct visual information regarding the whereabouts of the
toy was given), the dogs’ performance was signiﬁcantly
better than in the Control trials (Wilcoxon signed-ranks
tests with FDRbl adjustment: P < 0.01 in each case).
It seems evident that when the bait was directly seen
under the baited box, neither the social cues (human
manipulation) nor the movement of the empty box was
sufﬁcient to distract the dogs’ choice.
Performance in noninforming conditions
The number of correct choices was at chance level in the
Control condition where no cues were given at all
(T(þ) ¼ 13.5, P ¼ 0.547). In this condition, dogs chose
from among the boxes randomly and they did not even
show any side bias (testing the number of choosing the
right side against the hypothetical median of 1 did not
show signiﬁcant difference; T(þ) ¼ T() ¼ 68, P ¼ 1).
In the human-given cues versus box-movement condi-
tion where dogs were also not informed about the location
of the toy, they showed preference for the human-
manipulated box, that is, dogs chose the human-manip-
ulated box more often than the moving box (T() ¼ 50,
P ¼ 0.039). Fourteen out of the 25 dogs repeatedly chose
the human-manipulated box, whereas only ﬁve of them
chose the moving box twice and six of them chose the hu-
man-manipulated box and the moving box once each dur-
ing the two trials.
Discussion
In this experiment our design made it possible to test
whether dogs rely exclusively on the direct visual in-
formation they received when they search for the toy or
alternatively, human social manipulation (touching the
container, gaze alternations between the container and
the subject) and/or the discriminative effect of the
movement of the container could have an effect on their
choice behaviour. Moreover, contrasting the latter two
‘nondirect informing cues’ we could assess the relative
importance of social-communicative cues versus the
attention-catching effect of the movement of the con-
tainers. In agreement with our observations in the ﬁrst
experiment, these results underline the dominant role of
the direct visual information (sight of the toy) when dogs
are allowed to see where the toy is and then select one of
the two containers. Furthermore, our results suggest that
social-communicative cues (approach, touching, gaze alter-
nation) can be considered as the more important factor for
the dogs’ choice in comparison with asocial-discriminative
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stimulus (movement of the container). When dogs had no
direct information about the location of the toy but could
witness the seemingly self-propelled moving away of one
of the boxes and human communication cues (tapping,
looking at) towards the other one, they showed signiﬁcant
preference for the human-manipulated target place. That
is, more individuals chose repeatedly the ‘socially marked’
container than the remotely moved one.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our results show that dogs can make inference by
exclusion: they are able to ﬁnd the hidden toy on the
basis of indirect visual information (sight of the empty
container). This reasoning, however, is manifested in
their performance only in that case when choice from
among the two target places can be made neither on the
basis of social-communicative cues (directional gestures,
attention) nor by use of any other simple discriminative
stimuli (movement of a container). The special impor-
tance of human manipulation even against other (aso-
cial) discriminative cues is supported by the results of the
third study showing that dogs preferably rely on human-
given cues versus remotely controlled movements of
a target place. This is one of the few studies giving
experimental evidence for inferential reasoning in dogs
(Gagnon & Dore´ 1992, 1993; Kaminski et al. 2004), con-
trary to those mainly object permanence studies which
reported that dogs, unlike apes, solve the single invisible
task not by inferring the location of the reward but by
using simple local rules (Watson et al. 2001; Collier-Baker
et al. 2004, 2006).
Collier-Baker et al. (2004) repeated the experiment of
Gagnon and Dore´ (1992) with several control tests and re-
ported that dogs base their search behaviour on a simple
adjacency rule (searching at a box adjacent to the displace-
ment device which originally contained the desired re-
ward) rather than on mentally reconstructing the past
trajectory of an object in the invisible displacement task.
These results might have been obtained because the ﬁnal
position of the displacement device was an unambiguous
and unbalanced cue (it was placed next to only one box).
These ﬁndings are partially supported by the present study
showing that dogs’ choice behaviour was directed by local
rules (‘Preferring the moving container’ and ‘Preferring
the container manipulated by the human’) when the hu-
man social-communicative cues and moving of the hiding
place were presented unbalanced on only one container
for the dogs (Empty condition). However, it is important
to note that if the dog received indirect visual information
(the sight of the empty container) while the other cues
(human communication cues and the movements of the
hiding places) were presented on both containers, it did
not use local rules but chose by inferring the location of
the reward.
According to several studies, great apes do not simply
associate cues of different modalities (visual, auditory)
with reward but they seem to show understanding of the
causal connections between the sight of the empty hiding
place (or e.g. the noiselessness of a shaken empty cup) and
the virtual place of the hidden food and inferring by
exclusion (Premack & Premack 1994; de Blois et al. 1998;
Call & Carpenter 2001; Call 2004). On the other hand,
apes in general show poor performance in using human
communicative cues in which one individual attempts
to direct the other’s attention to some third entity (see
Call & Tomasello 2003 for review). Thus, it can be as-
sumed that they are not (so much) subjected to the pre-
vailing bias towards cues of human behaviour (Bra¨uer
et al. 2006), though further studies are needed for the sup-
port of this prediction.
In contrast, dogs would rather use the human commu-
nicative (pointing, looking at) and behavioural cues
(trying to open a box or trying to reach something) and
are skilful to understand the communicative cues of
complex ‘triadic’ situations with humans, while they fail
to use the causal cues (the presence or absence of the
noise, the smell or the shape of the food) to ﬁnd the
hidden reward in one of two boxes. In line with the social-
dog, causal-ape hypothesis suggested by Bra¨uer et al.
(2006), we found that the human cues and/or the moving
of the hiding places is much more important for the dogs
than the sight of the empty container. Results support the
view that although movement is an attractive cue per
se which can be used by many species to track prey,
human-given social cues have even higher importance
for the dogs. This has been most likely intensiﬁed by the
process of domestication (Miklo´si et al. 2004; Bra¨uer
et al. 2006).
Accordingly, it can be speculated that the restricted
manifestation of dogs’ reasoning abilities is not due to the
effect of domestication in the reduction of problem-
solving abilities (Frank 1980) but it is being masked by
bias in following social cues. This would be in line with
the dependency argument made by Topa´l et al. (1997).
However, to go beyond mere speculation, direct com-
parison with wolves, Canis lupus, would be needed. First of
all we need to test whether wolves are at all capable of in-
ferential reasoning in a similar paradigm, and, assuming
they are, how manifestation of this skill is inﬂuenced by
certain local rules like attraction to moving and/or hu-
man-manipulated objects. Based on the low-level use of
human-given cues by young wolves to ﬁnd hidden food,
in comparison to apes, one can hypothesize that the per-
formance of wolves would be less restricted by human so-
cial cues than that of dogs.
At present we only know that dogs’ reasoning ability is
suppressed by a prevailing bias to attend movements and
human manipulation. More importantly, this behaviour
can be regarded as functionally analogous to that shown
by human infants, though this argument will be strength-
ened if the above differences are found between wolves
and dogs. Many argue that in some of the cognitive tasks,
human infants show similar patterns of success and error,
suggesting that children’s competence is often hidden by
bias which is a simple heuristic whose usefulness and
prevalence declines with age (Mitchell 1996).
More importantly, our experimental design allowed us
to evaluate the plausibility of different choice rules and
to make a more sophisticated analysis of choice situa-
tions. Based upon their choices, dogs are willing to rely
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on memory traces of simple associations between the
hiding place and the sight of the reward (provided that
they had visual access to the content of the baited
container). However, when direct visual information
about the bait is missing, social marking of the target
place (by the human) is of great importance. Namely,
when communicative cues and ‘self-propelled’ move-
ment of the containers are contrasted, ‘asocial cues’
had only secondary effect on dogs’ choice behaviour. It
seems therefore that dogs show some competence in
tasks requiring inferential reasoning; however, this ability
is often masked by their bias for cues of human
communication. Accordingly, dogs’ behaviour may be
described by a set of hierarchically ordered choice rules
and different combinations of these rules which can be
used by the dog to make a decision in the problem
situation. Using reasoning by exclusion is one of the
competing possibilities, though not the dominant one,
in the case of the dog.
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